Antitrust and IPOs in the Supreme Court
Clark C. Havighurst
Wm. Neal Reynolds Emeritus Professor of Law
Duke University
[April 12, 2007]
Abstract: This short comment suggests a connection, so far unrecognized, between
two antitrust cases currently awaiting decision by the Supreme Court. In one case,
the Court is likely, though not certain, to overturn the long-standing rule that resale
price maintenance is illegal per se. If that should occur, another case on the Court’s
docket, involving the scope of the implied antitrust immunity enjoyed by
underwriters of corporate securities offerings, would (or should) look very different.
This comment suggests that, if the law of vertical restraints is finally rationalized so
that an issuer of a security may lawfully restrict price and other competition among
its distributors, the traditional basis for inferring a congressional intention to
exempt securities offerings from the Sherman Act (a “clear repugnancy” between
two statutory regimes) would at least arguably disappear. Although the justices are
unlikely to see the point in the pending case on underwriter immunity, there might
be room for future antitrust challenges to horizontal restraints conceived and
implemented by underwriters in IPOs.

On March 27, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case questioning how
much antitrust immunity the federal securities laws confer by implication on investment
bankers collaborating in the underwriting of securities offerings. Although none of the
briefs or arguments in that case1 so observed, another pending case,2 argued just one day
earlier, could well change a basic rule of antitrust law in such a way that an antitrust
exemption would no longer be needed to allow initial public offerings of securities
(IPOs) to proceed efficiently and effectively. In the unlikely event that the justices
connect the dots between these two cases and see the implications outlined in this
comment, U.S. financial markets and the issuers of securities would benefit. Investment
bankers, however, would lose much of their current ability to manage IPOs to their own,
rather than the issuer’s, advantage.

1
2

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC. v. Billing, U.S. Sup. Ct., Dkt. No. 05-1157 (2007).
Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc.. v. PSKS, Inc., U.S. Sup. Ct., Dkt. No. 06-480 (2007).

2
In the first-argued of the two cases, the Court has what should be a welcome
opportunity to overrule the well-known Dr. Miles case,3 a 1911 decision in which some
highly artificial reasoning produced the rule that a seller of a product may under no
circumstances fix its dealers’ resale prices. That case’s relevance to IPOs arises because
restrictions on competition among participating underwriters may be either “vertical” or
“horizontal.” That is, they may either be imposed on the underwriters by the issuer of the
securities or result from an agreement among the underwriters themselves. If the issuer
itself sets the price at which its underwriters are required to resell, it would be a clear
instance of resale price maintenance (RPM) – precisely what the Dr. Miles case
condemned.
The rule against RPM has been applied over the years only to the marketing of
branded consumer products like Dr. Miles’ patent medicines. But there is no reason in
antitrust logic why it would not apply equally to the marketing of a particular issuer’s
securities.4

Not only is a security a similarly distinctive product, but underwriters,

despite their elite status, are no different for antitrust purposes from ordinary retailers. In
any event, the possibility that antitrust law’s prohibitions of price fixing and other
restrictions on competition might interfere with IPOs has long supported an assumption
that Congress expects only the securities laws to govern underwritings. And no one
participating in the Supreme Court argument of the IPO case suggested that an overruling
of Dr. Miles, if it should occur, might be a reason to reconsider whether any antitrust
exemption for IPOs is really necessary. Yet if the Court does finally rationalize the law
of vertical price fixing, the legal prerequisite for inferring an antitrust exemption for IPO
arrangements – a “clear repugnancy” between antitrust law and the regulatory scheme5 –
would arguably disappear.
On the other hand, the IPO example itself clearly shows why the Dr. Miles rule
should be overturned. There are very convincing business reasons why an issuer might
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instruct its underwriters, which bear substantial financial risks in any event, not to engage
in competitive price cutting in selling their IPO allotments. This example alone is
enough to show that a blanket prohibition of RPM makes no economic sense. Yet no one
arguing that the Supreme Court got it wrong in 1911 has thought to cite the logic and
efficiency of RPM in the marketing of corporate securities as proof that restricting dealer
price competition can be a perfectly legitimate strategy in marketing a distinctive
product. As long as the larger (“interbrand”) market is vigorously competitive (as the
market for investments clearly is), providing price protection in the “intrabrand” market
is simply an efficient way for a seller to attract good dealers and to compensate them for
working successfully on its behalf.
It is also customary in IPOs to restrict various forms of non-price competition in
order to facilitate a smooth distribution. At one time, antitrust law was just as hostile to
vertically imposed non-price restraints as it was to vertical price fixing. In a series of
cases over the last thirty years, however, the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the
ability of producers of consumer products to control their dealers’ competitive efforts,
even when price competition among them was significantly curtailed.6 Although some
justices’ questions at oral argument of the RPM case suggested a continued attachment to
the now-anomalous rule of Dr. Miles, there is every reason why RPM, clearly the best
strategy available for effectively marketing certain products (including corporate
securities), should receive the same sympathetic treatment as vertical non-price restraints.
If the Supreme Court were now to decide that vertical price fixing may sometimes
be defensible under antitrust law’s rule of reason, the need for an antitrust exemption for
anticompetitive arrangements in an IPO would be far from clear. In applying the rule of
reason, a court would view a securities underwriting as an arguably procompetitive joint
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venture between the issuer and dealers it selects, analyzing the venture’s inevitable
restraints on competition among the underwriters only to ensure their validity as ancillary
restraints facilitating the larger distribution effort.

The analysis would begin by

recognizing the issuer’s legitimate, procompetitive interest in controlling how its
securities are marketed, so as to maximize the proceeds to itself and minimize any
dilution of its shareholders’ interests. The other side of this coin, of course, would be that
investment bankers would face potential antitrust liability for anticompetitive
arrangements originating from their own horizontal agreements, not with the issuer itself.
But an antitrust exemption is called for, presumably, only if it is necessary to facilitate
the marketing of securities, not to protect underwriters as such or their anticompetitive
agreements. Although competitor collaboration in joint ventures can often be justified on
efficiency grounds, a court could reasonably hold (under the rule of reason’s “lessrestrictive-alternative” requirement) that underwriters in an IPO must submit to the
issuer’s control rather than controlling competition-sensitive matters themselves.
Unfortunately, distinguishing between vertical and horizontal restraints is not
always easy. Issuers naturally seek and take their underwriters’ advice on many matters,
and there should be no antitrust obstacle to such normal cooperation. But an issuer’s
ability to control its own offering would be in jeopardy if its underwriters are in a
position to dictate details of the offering, including the offering price. There are reasons
to doubt that today’s market for underwriters’ services is competitive and unregulated
enough to give issuers a truly free hand in selecting and controlling their underwriters.7
If the market’s invisible hand is weak, then investment bankers may have the upper one –
which, if they exercise it, could get them into antitrust trouble. Good legal advice, if they
follow it, should protect them, however. Unwarranted lawsuits should be subject to
summary judgment on a clear showing that the issuer, perhaps with independent advice,
approved the marketing plan.
The felt need to infer antitrust exemptions for restrictions on underwriter
competition in IPOs originally arose because antitrust law posed a potential threat to the
orderly marketing of securities, by seeming to call into question any restrictions on
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competition between members of an underwriter group. However, removal of the Dr.
Miles rule, under which sellers of distinctive products are flatly prohibited from
prescribing their dealers’ resale prices, would finally enable courts applying the antitrust
laws to securities underwriters to take the issuer’s point of view. The courts’ goal should
then be to allow issuers, rather than the underwriters acting in their own interest, to
determine which restraints will be helpful in marketing their securities in competition
with other securities in a highly competitive “interbrand” market.

Not only would

antitrust law, so applied, enhance the ability of corporations to raise capital and the
overall efficiency of capital markets, but the goals and substance of antitrust law would
become congruent with the goals and substance of the nation’s securities laws. There
would no longer be a judicially noticeable need for an antitrust exemption to protect the
delicate process of securities marketing from disruption by misguided antitrust courts.
An antitrust exemption for securities underwriters engaged in IPOs would no longer be
necessary to make the SEC’s regulatory scheme for securities underwritings (and the
underwriting syndicates it contemplates) “work.”8
In the pending IPO litigation, some important underwriters are seeking to avoid
antitrust liability for collectively using their power over shares in heavy demand during
the dot-com boom to manipulate prices in the aftermarket.

Their argument is that

antitrust oversight is not needed or appropriate because the SEC has authority to police
any objectionable conduct. The manipulations in question – so-called “tie-ins” and
“laddering” practices – were particularly egregious, however, and occurred on the SEC’s
watch, suggesting that stronger sanctions may be needed. The specific restraints alleged
were decidedly not the kind that issuers would be likely to approve.
In any event, the Supreme Court is practically certain to decide the pending IPO
case on the narrow grounds on which it was argued, either extending or not extending the
investment bankers’ antitrust exemption for IPOs but not raising at all the question of the
exemption’s continued legitimacy. This would be ironic if simultaneously, after 96 years
in error, the Court were finally to acknowledge that a producer of a unique product has,
under normal competitive circumstances, a legitimate interest in controlling all aspects of
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its marketing. Certainly, the issuer of a security is a far more appropriate party than
either the SEC or the underwriters themselves to decide how much competition should be
restricted in marketing it. If the Dr. Miles rule is overturned, a later case may challenge
the need for a continuing antitrust exemption for IPOs – unless, of course, the investment
bankers get to Congress first.
Defenders of IPO underwriters’ antitrust immunity in the Supreme Court have
argued that the strength and attractiveness of U.S. capital markets require that immunity
be very broad. A more persuasive argument might be that capital markets would be more
efficient and more attractive to issuers if, because of American antitrust law, the issuers
themselves, and not their underwriters, could effectively control the marketing of their
securities.

